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Building on Mouffe’s critique of cosmopolitanism this paper argues that a cosmopolitan mode of 
remembering, far from having superseded the antagonistic mode associated with ‘first modernity’ in 
the European context, has proved unable to prevent the rise of, and is being increasingly challenged 
by, new antagonistic collective memories constructed by populist neo-nationalist movements. The 
paper outlines the main defining characteristics of a third ‘agonistic’ mode of remembering, which 
is both reflexive and dialogic, yet also relies upon politicized representations of past conflicts, 
acknowledging civic and political passions as well as individual and collective agency.  
 




The importance of memory in contemporary processes of collective identification has been 
theorized by a growing number of scholars from different disciplines in the last two decades. 
Particular attention has been paid to the different modes in which we remember the past and in this 
context an influential body of work has distinguished between an antagonistic and a cosmopolitan 
mode of remembering.1 The former relies on heritage as monumentalism and on a canonical version 
of history, as well as a Manichean division of the historical characters into good and evil. It also 
relies on celebratory, glorifying or nostalgic narrative styles. The ethical/cosmopolitan mode of 
remembering, by contrast, emphasizes the human suffering of past atrocities and human rights 
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violations and represents ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in abstract terms. Its main narrative styles are 
characterized by reflexivity, regret and mourning.    
In this paper we build upon Mouffe’s (2005) critique of cosmopolitanism by arguing that a 
cosmopolitan mode of remembering, far from having superseded the antagonistic mode associated 
with ‘first modernity’ in the European context, has proved unable to prevent the rise of, and is being 
increasingly challenged by, new antagonistic collective memories constructed by populist neo-
nationalist movements. During the last few decades and especially after the recent economic crisis, 
in fact, political antagonism in the shape of populist neo-nationalist movements inimical to the 
European project and above all to a borderless society and the inclusion of migrants has been on the 
rise throughout the EU. The 2014 European elections marked the high point in the success and 
diffusion of this type of antagonistic politics. 
While Levy and Sznaider (2002) argued that cosmopolitanization and Europeanization had 
successfully influenced national narratives and Rigney (2012a) wrote of transnational solidarity 
being promoted by the circulation of local and national memories across Europe thanks to literary 
and artistic works, recent trends suggest that antagonistic neo-nationalism has itself been able to  
promote novel forms of memory work and construct a Europe-wide narrative, albeit one bent upon 
destroying the European project. Thus the extreme right's nationalistic discourse, expressed in an 
antagonistic mode, is also transnationally mediatized. In this context, we propose a third mode of 
remembering, which we define as ‘agonistic’, as a possible way forward in order to overcome the 
current lack of interaction between the other two modes, which in itself is also an indicator of the 
growing and worrying divergence between an ‘exterritorial elite’ and the ‘settled majority’. 
 
Cosmopolitan memory and its critics 
Cosmopolitanism as a philosophical position was originally adopted by the Ancient Greeks and is 
as old as European civilization itself, but cosmopolitanism as a political and ideological position 
within the discussion of contemporary globalized society is closelytied to the proliferation of 
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theories of globalization after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. According to James (2014: 
x), contemporary cosmopolitanism can, in this sense, be defined as: ‘a global politics that, firstly, 
projects a sociality of common political engagement among all human beings across the globe, and, 
secondly, suggests that this sociality should be either ethically or organizationally privileged over 
other forms of sociality’.  
The cosmopolitan memory discourse emerged as a result of two different but narrowly 
intertwined phenomena. On the one hand, it grew out of the transnational Holocaust memory that 
probably began with the famous TV series Holocaust in 1978 and increased steadily in scope and 
importance through the 1980s (Levy and Sznaider, 2002: 96). On the other hand, it fed upon the 
growing consciousness of coming to terms with the violent past of the authoritarian regimes of the 
20th century, a tendency that surfaced during the 1990s as a result of a general human rights 
discourse. Huyssen (2011: 607) interprets this specific human rights movement that developed after 
1989 as a last utopian vision after the collapse of all the utopias of the 20th century such as Fascism, 
Communism, modernization and decolonization, and argues that the hope for the future 
establishment of a human rights regime on a global scale invigorates local memory discourses and 
makes them conflate and hybridize within a transnational memory discourse. And it is probably this 
double influence of Holocaust memory and human rights criticism of former abuses that has given 
the cosmopolitan memory discourse what Novick (2000: 8) has labelled the ‘attitude towards 
victimhood’. Thus narratives of the past take as their point of departure the experience of the 
suffering of the victim and his or her descendants, while the image of the ‘hero’ in the traditional 
sense disappears from the stories.  
One could say that the antagonistic and cosmopolitan modes of remembering have been 
associated with different historical phases. The antagonistic mode is linked to the dominance of the 
territorial nation-state, whereas the cosmopolitan mode pertains to the contemporary period, marked 
by a weakening of established national forms of identification and the emergence of transnational 
and translocal forms of belonging which challenge fixed boundaries.2 Territory implies political 
4 
 
control exercised in exclusionary terms, as well as military and economic power: territory and state 
power have long been synonymous. The nation-state also revolved around the construction of an 
imagined community sharing a common culture and common values and surrounded by a symbolic 
boundary which excluded all those outside or adhering to a ‘nomadic’ style of life. As Bauman 
(2000: 13) wrote, during the period characterized by ‘solid modernity’, ‘citizenship went hand in 
hand with settlement’, whereas in the current phase of ‘liquid modernity’ ‘we are witnessing the 
revenge of nomadism over the principle of territoriality and settlement […] the settled majority is 
ruled by the nomadic and exterritorial elite’. Or, as Beck argued, ‘first modernity’ was characterized 
by the dominance of the nation-state defined by territorial boundaries, whereas ‘second modernity’ 
witnesses its undermining (Beck, 1992; Beck, Bonss and Lau, 2003).  People are less and less 
restricted by a sense of place, so much so that according to Meyrowitz (1986) there is ‘no sense of 
place’ in an increasingly interconnected world.  Amin (2002) argued that in the age of globalization 
space should be conceived in terms of relational processes and networks beyond any geographical 
scale. Within this perspective, places still matter, but no longer as bounded sites of geographical 
proximity. Hence sovereignty is no longer an indivisible, exclusive and perpetual form of public 
power fully contained within an individual state (Held, 1995: 107-113). 
As well as historical processes, state nationalism and cosmopolitanism are also conceived 
as ethico-political projects. From this perspective, ‘the cosmopolitan ethos states that the new role 
of nation-states is borderless inclusion and humanitarian control’ (Ossewaarde, 2007). Hence 
nation-states are not completely superseded but their political role has radically changed. Similarly, 
it has been argued, a cosmopolitan memory has not come to supersede particularistic national 
memory cultures; rather, in the European context a cosmopolitan mode of remembering has 
impacted upon national narratives by engendering certain ‘repertoires of memory work – 
affirmative but ambivalent perceptions of Europeanness, sceptical narratives about the nation 
emphasizing injustice and perpetratorship, and an increased recognition of the Other. While there is 
no unified (or unifying) European memory […] there are shared cosmopolitan memory practices’ 
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(Levy, Heinlein and Breuer, 2011: 141). Furthermore, while collective memories are no longer the 
prerogative of nation-states, as the latter now have to contend with other scales of identification, the 
supranational and the subnational, these other scales have also been influenced by a cosmopolitan 
mode of remembering (Levy and Sznaider, 2007: 161). 
 Viewed as an ethico-political project, cosmopolitanism has given rise to concerns and 
misgivings. The main proponents of a cosmopolitan memory, Levy and Sznaider, have themselves 
acknowledged the risk that cosmopolitanism may be conceived and perceived as a deeply 
Eurocentric project, as a new form of universalism which has its roots in the Enlightenment (2007). 
As they stated, ‘Despite its declaration to recognize otherness, core European cosmopolitanism is 
falling back into established patterns of “othering”’ (2007: 174). This is particularly the case in 
relation to Eastern European countries, where the ‘resurgence of national narratives is one 
relationship onto which core Europeans project this new universalism’ (p. 174). Levy and Sznaider 
therefore prefer to conceptualize comopolitanization as a process as opposed to promoting 
cosmopolitanism as a project. 
 Others, like Mouffe (2005, 2012) or Cazdyn and Szeman (2013), have advanced a much 
more fundamental critique of cosmopolitanism, accusing it of ignoring the political substance of 
social conflict. Cazdyn and Szeman view cosmopolitanism as closely linked to globalization but 
consider the latter an ideological project as opposed to a process. Far from signalling the end of 
nation-states, it constituted ‘a particularly effective figure/concept in extending US hegemony in the 
wake of the Cold War’ (2013: 28). According to Mouffe (2005), the cosmopolitan discourse, in 
arguing for solutions built upon transnational institutions and universal rights, ignores real and 
legitimate differences of social and political interests and leaves vital political questions 
unanswered for populist nationalists, racists, and fundamentalists to seize upon. For Mouffe the 
very relational character of cultural identity – i.e. the necessity of subjects and communities 
positioning themselves in relation to the ‘Other’ – implies the potential for antagonistic 
confrontation, where political opponents are viewed as enemies to be destroyed. The threat of an 
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antagonistic social development can be kept in check if the antagonistic relation is transformed into 
what Mouffe calls ‘agonism’ (Mouffe, 2005 and 2012). Agonism refers to the relationship between 
political adversaries who share the same symbolic space and respect the democratic rules 
established as conditions for the struggle for hegemony. Furthermore, agonism refers to the need to 
recognize emotions and passions as an integral part of political confrontation, while also giving 
them ‘a democratic outlet’ (2005: 30), thus neutralizing the risk that they may be appropriated by 
intolerant and undemocratic movements.    
 
The rise of an antagonistic mode of remembering 
The proponents of a cosmopolitan memory tend to downplay the significance of neo–nationalism, 
arguing that it is no longer linked to territory, and seriously underestimate the emergence of 
movements bent on (re)constructing territorial forms of identification. More importantly, scholars 
seemingly overlook the important and novel role played by memory work in accounting for the 
increasing popularity of these movements. In fact, the antagonistic mode of remembering should 
not be viewed as a remnant of a historical phase dominated by the nation-state but as an integral 
part of ‘second’ or ‘liquid’ modernity. The search for community, for clear boundaries separating 
‘us’ from ‘them’ as an antidote to insecurity constitutes a prominent feature of present–day society 
(Bauman, 2001). As Bauman wrote (2000: 214), ‘Signs of malaise are abundant and salient yet […] 
they seek in vain a legitimate expression in the world of politics. Short of articulate expression, they 
need to be read, obliquely, from the outburst of xenophobic and racist frenzy’.  
Across Europe, populist nationalist and/or radical right movements have developed 
counter-memories in a strongly antagonistic mode, re-imagined territory in  exclusionary terms, and 
constructed rigid symbolic boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’. In direct opposition to current 
processes of critical reflection on past conflicts and injustices, these movements promote memories 
which essentialize, as opposed to problematizing, a collective sense of sameness and we-ness, with 
accompanying sentiments of they-ness. The community of reference and the memory work they 
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engage with tend to vary. Micro-nationalist movements, such as the Flemish and Basque, have 
turned traditional foundational narratives of war against their nation-states (Beyen, 2011; Muro, 
2009). Various forms of political regionalism reject European citizenship (Painter, 2008) and are 
reminiscent of New Right ideology’s emphasis on ‘nativist’ and exclusionary bonding memories 
(Spektorowski 2003: 61). Right-wing populist-nationalist movements, like the French Front 
National or the Austrian Freedom Party, have rearticulated the memory of nation-states in open 
antagonism to cosmopolitanism.  
Taken together, these movements cannot be viewed simply as repeating the trajectory of 
modern nationalism. According to Pinxten (2006: 138), micro-nationalist parties are characterized 
by the refusal of modernity. Others view them as post-modern, since they construct ‘authentic’ 
ethno-territorial identities ex-novo, while presenting them as primordial. Thus Agnew and Brusa 
(1999: 123) defined the Lega Nord as ‘maybe the first authentic post-modernist territorial political 
movement in its self-conscious manipulation of territorial imagery’. Even seemingly traditional 
nationalist movements have reworked the past in novel ways. Gullestad (2006: 70), in relation to 
the Norwegian Progress Party, identified a process of neo-ethnification of national identity at play, 
‘when old ideas are rearticulated and gain new importance as social imaginaries in new situations’. 
Art (2010: 6-7) argued that ‘right-wing populists have decried the “politically correct” histories 
disseminated by elites out of touch with the values and historical memories of ordinary people’. 
If it is the case that pro-European heritage professionals, intellectuals and movements tend 
to prioritize a depoliticized cosmopolitan mode of remembering (Kansteiner, 2002: 189), whereas 
Eurosceptic neo-nationalist movements prioritize a politicized antagonistic mode, and that the 
cosmopolitan mode seems unable not only to stem the growing success of the antagonistic mode of 
remembering but also to address the experiences of many people who feel the pressure of socio-
economic change, we have to conclude that we are in serious need of rethinking the ways in which 




Victims and perpetrators: re-instating the historical context  
While we accept that an emphasis on perpetrators vs. victims runs the  risk of perpetuating a 
contraposition between ‘us’ and ‘them’,  we should not neglect the socio-political context in which 
human beings came to commit evil acts and the human agency that promoted this shift. As pointed 
out by Labanyi (2008), an exclusive focus on victimhood tends to construct history as something 
done to people, negating individual agency. Indeed Levy and Sznaider (2002: 103) argued explicitly 
that the exemplary narrative in the cosmopolitan mode of remembering is that of the ‘non-acting 
victim’. In his extensive discussion of past and present constructions of heroes and victims by 
collective memory, Giesen (2004: 67) argued forcefully that nowadays ‘the victims themselves have 
no voices and no faces. They are dead, muted in their misery, numbed in their trauma’. He added 
that, ‘by their very definition, victims are seen as powerless and unable to fight for their own rights 
[…] Because of their damaged subjectivity, their muteness and anonymity, they need mediating 
third parties who articulate their suffering and advocate their claims – they need civic or 
professional representation’ (69). Hence agency is transferred to ‘professional specialists’, acting as 
‘mediators between the victims and the public sphere’ (69). According to Giesen, the current 
construction of victimhood fits the ‘impersonal and anonymous order of modern society we live in’ 
much better than the figure of the hero, so much so that those who were seen as heroes nowadays 
tend to appear in the guise of perpetrators.  It is important to note that Giesen’s reference to the type 
of society associated with the turn to victimhood chimes with Mouffe’s (2005: 34) critique of 
current democratic practices for reducing politics to ‘a set of supposedly technical moves and 
neutral procedures’. Also, Giesen’s view that agency has been transferred to professional specialists 
brings to mind Kansteiner’s critique of cosmopolitan memory for being restricted to European 
bureaucrats and professionals.    
Giesen himself points out the risks associated with the current construction of victimhood, 
namely a paternalistic attitude in line with the empowerment of experts and professionals and the 
erasure of any ambiguity and ambivalence surrounding the concepts of victims and perpetrators, 
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whereby ‘the boundary between just and unjust, good and evil, good citizens and perpetrators, is 
fragile and shifting’ (63). It is interesting, however, that, when addressing the issue of how victims 
are remembered, Giesen acknowledges that they can be remembered either impersonally or ‘as 
subjects with a place, a face and a voice within a community’ (56). We would add that they can also 
be remembered as subjects with a collective, as well as an individual, political voice and agency. 
Indeed, it is often this political agency as well as the historical context and power struggles that 
turned many into victims and many others into perpetrators, bystanders, spies or indeed ambivalent 
figures. If we are to avoid the risk that the demythologizing of those who used to be heroes turns 
into their demonization, leaving open the possibility that they are re-appropriated as heroes by 
antagonistic and anti-democratic political movements, we need to promote a kind of collective 
memory that re-instates the social and political agency of those who became victims on the one 
hand, and re-humanizes the heroes-now-turned-perpetrators on the other.  
We do not in fact subscribe to the view that evil is ‘inhuman’ and that criminals are 
‘monsters’. Both the cosmopolitan and the antagonistic modes of remembering rely on moral 
categories of ‘good’ and ‘evil’. Whereas in the antagonistic mode these categories apply to 
particularistic tales of ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’, the cosmopolitan mode prioritizes a de-
historicized and abstract opposition between good and evil. As Levy and Sznaider (2002: 102) put 
it: ‘It is precisely the abstract nature of ‘good and evil’ that symbolizes the Holocaust, which 
contributes to the extra-territorial quality of cosmopolitan memory’. In many cases this abstract 
approach takes the form of equalizing totalitarian ideologies with ‘evil’. By contrast, we agree with 
Todorov (2009: 454-5) that all human beings ‘have an equal potential for good and evil’ and that, 
while it is important to empathize with the suffering of the victims, there is a need ‘to attract 
attention to the mechanisms of the production of evil’ (455). In a recent article (2012: 539–40), 
Rothberg also makes a strong case against the use of the Holocaust as a ‘code for “good and evil”’, 
arguing that ‘a discourse based on clear-cut visions of victims and perpetrators or of innocence and 
guilt evacuates the political sphere of complexity and reduces it to a morality tale’. 
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Focusing exclusively on the victims can also preclude the possibility of remembering and 
understanding the historical context. Both the antagonistic and the cosmopolitan modes of 
remembering tend to simplify past historical events, hampering a critical understanding of their 
complexity. The antagonistic mode opts to turn historical events into foundational myths of the 
community of belonging and is therefore prone to misrepresent or manipulate the past, promoting 
forgetting as much as (selective) remembering. The cosmopolitan mode de-contextualizes the past 
in order to transcend historical particularism and promote a new kind of universalism. However as 
Olick (2007: 148) argued, learning from the past ‘means listening to both victims and perpetrators, 
and not to judge absolute truth or even to sympathize with either but to learn from their experiences 
and perspectives’.   
Learning from the past also means changing the present in order to ensure that the 
conditions and processes which may lead to mass crimes are not repeated in the present. As Rigney 
(2012b: 253) argued, ‘At times, the reconciliation scenario itself may help obfuscate the fact that 
past injustices have persisted into the present and that a radical change in the present, and not just 
symbolic gestures towards the past, may be required’. Adopting a similar perspective, the issue of 
human rights also needs to be conceived not just as pertaining to the institutional and juridical 
spheres, but as requiring socio-political agency and bottom-up mobilization in the present.  As 
Balibar argued, human rights are ‘insurrectional rights’, whereby ‘individuals and groups do not 
receive them from an external sovereign power or from a transcendent revelation, but rather confer 
this right upon themselves, or grant themselves rights reciprocally’ (2007; 2013). Furthermore, 
according to Fine (2010), the risk of de-humanizing both victims and perpetrators, which we 
associated with the cosmopolitan memory, is already present in international humanitarian and 
human rights law.  
The turn to cosmopolitan memory is linked to trauma theory, with its emphasis on the 
unknowability and unspeakability of traumatic events and on the partial recovery of memory 
through victims’ testimonies to a witness (Felman and Laub, 1992; Caruth, 1995 and 1996). Trauma 
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theory has also deeply informed Holocaust studies. In particular, Felman and Laub (1992) argued 
that survivors of the Holocaust were unable to recount what they had gone through, because they 
had lost the capacity to bear witness to themselves, and it was only many years later that they were 
able partially to recover their memory through a process of witnessing. Similarly, van Alphen 
(1999) coined the expression ‘semiotic incapacity’ in relation to Holocaust victims’ inability to 
represent past traumatic events. Trauma theory has been critiqued for a variety of reasons and from 
different perspectives. From our own perspective, we would like to highlight the treatment of 
victims and perpetrators in trauma theory, which in our view is particularly problematic and which 
is comparable to the main shortcoming of cosmopolitan memory.  The theory constructs all victims 
of violence as suffering from trauma and therefore as unable to retell their past and to act as agents. 
As Kansteiner (2004: 214) put it: ‘‘those exposed to violence are summarily turned into victims’.  
However, even in the case of the Holocaust, it has been shown that other factors besides trauma 
may also have prevented many victims from speaking out, including a lack of suitable interlocutors 
and the inability to reach the public sphere (Waxman, 2006; Wieviorka, 2006). This is even more 
often the case when mass atrocities are carried out in the context of civil wars, as many victims find 
themselves in a post-conflict environment characterized by hostile social and political reception of 
their stories and a general will to forget about the past. As Labanyi (2009, p. 28) stated with 
reference to Spain, ‘An absence of narration does not necessarily mean the existence of a traumatic 
block, though it may well indicate the existence of some kind of coercion or the lack of adequate 
conditions for the memory’s reception by others’. Once again, therefore, this points to the need to 
incorporate the socio-political context in our representations and understanding of victims, both in 
relation to the period when they were victimized and in relation to the post-conflict period, when 
they struggled to regain agency. 
        
Reflexivity and dialogue 
12 
 
Memory should be reflexive in ways which not only expose its socially constructed nature and/or 
include the suffering of the ‘Others’, but also through a dialogic approach which relies on a 
multiplicity of perspectives (Bakhtin, 1981, 1984). This type of dialogue is open-ended and does 
not aim at any specific conclusion, and in this sense it differs from that envisaged by Habermas 
(1984: 17), for whom communication should be ‘oriented to achieving, sustaining and reviewing 
consensus’. Let us consider these two approaches more in detail. 
Habermas’s concept of ethical dialogue is rooted in the conviction that ideological 
differences and opposed material interests can be set aside in the public sphere in pursuit of 
consensus (Gardiner 2004: 29). This implies that his concept of dialogue takes place in an inclusive 
public sphere governed by transparent, universalist principles and is based ‘on the central 
experience of the unconstrained, unifying, consensus-bringing force of argumentative speech’ 
(Habermas, 1984: 10). Argumentation involves both a process ‘oriented to reaching understanding’ 
and a procedure ‘subject to special rules’; furthermore, ‘it has as its aim to produce cogent 
arguments that are convincing in virtue of their intrinsic properties and with which validity claims 
can be redeemed or rejected’ (Habermas, 1984: 25). A person behaving rationally is defined by 
Habermas as ‘a person who is both willing and able to free himself from illusions, and indeed on 
illusions that are based not on errors (about facts) but on self-deceptions (about one’s own 
subjective experiences)’. Conversely, ‘anyone who systematically deceives himself about himself 
behaves irrationally’ (Habermas, 1984: 21). According to Gardiner (2004: 33), Habermas’s notion 
of the communicating subject rests on an idealist outlook that seeks ‘to engulf the alterity of things 
in the unity of thought’. The subject is not in any way decontextualized from society, but immersed 
in a lifeworld that functions as a pre-reflective background of assumptions that are taken for 
granted. 
For Bakhtin, on the other hand, the subject is of a fundamentally dialogic nature, based on a 
relation between the I-for-myself, the not-in-me (the other) and the-other-in-me, i.e. the subject’s 
appropriation of the other’s vision from outside (Holquist, 1990). As Bakhtin expresses it in his 
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characteristic style:  ‘I cannot manage without another, I cannot become myself without another; I 
must find myself in another by finding another in myself (in mutual reflection and mutual 
acceptance)’ (Bakhtin, 1984: 287). Bakhtin’s subject is situated in a concrete context of time and 
space, characterized by the co-existence of opposed and contradictory social forces and ideological 
dispositions, and this is why language use and dialogue in Backtin’s sense is dispossessed of the 
teleological perspective of reaching consensus, but is of a rather agonistic nature (Gardiner, 2004: 
39). In Backtin’s perspective, living speech reflects social material and social interests and is 
imbued with myriads of collateral meanings of earlier discourses and anticipated answers.  
Scholars like Gardiner and Roberts (2012), who have both compared Habermas’s and 
Bakhtin’s concepts of dialogue, seem to agree on at least two essential questions. Firstly, that where 
Habermas’s concept of lifeworld is an idealistic construction, which, in Roberts’ words (2012: 406), 
‘lacks a theory of contradiction’, the everyday dialogue or ‘background language’ in Bakhtin’s 
thinking is imbued with social and cultural differences and contradictions. And secondly, where 
Habermas’s concept of ethical dialogue is restricted to the ‘ideal speech situation’ among equal 
citizens, hence divorced from concrete social settings and teleologically directed towards rational 
consensus, there is no such aim of reaching an ultimate truth in Bakhtin’s thinking. Quite to the 
contrary, according to Bakhtin, a unified truth can only be expressed through a plurality of 
perspectives. 
The cosmopolitan mode is dialogic and multi-perspectivist in so far as it incorporates the 
perspectives of the ‘Other’ as a victim and conceives dialogue as a means to achieve reconciliation, 
but it is unable to incorporate the perspective of the opposed ‘Other’, the perpetrator as a subject in 
his own right. As stated by Crownshaw, there has been a turn towards the figure of the perpetrator in 
recent historical fiction (Crownshaw, 2011), to which we want to add the genres of documentary 
and historiography. But if we take the above into consideration, it turns out to be of utmost 
importance how the perspective of the perpetrator is introduced. Analyzing the media 
representations of the Eichmann trial, Torgovnick discusses two different modes which she terms 
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‘Eichmann is in all of us’ and ‘anyone could be Eichmann’. Whereas the former approach 
universalizes the potential for perpetration and bypasses the social circumstances in which 
perpetration becomes possible, telling us that we all have some evil inside, the latter gives priority 
to the historical contingencies of perpetration, forcing us to reflect upon our own way of responding 
to certain social circumstances (Torgovnick, 2005: 68). In this way the two modes of remembrance 
lead the audience to two different kinds of reflection and self-reflection. Let us give two examples. 
Eichinger and Hirschbiegel’s Downfall (Der Untergang, 2004), a film about the last days of 
Adolf Hitler’s life, delivers a convincing portrait of the dictator, not as a monster, but as a human 
being with feelings and empathy. Although public debate disputed the appropriateness of this 
humanizing depiction, it is our conviction that the average reception of the movie will follow 
Torgovnick’s ‘Eichmann is in all of us’ mode. By showing the human side of the monster, the film 
makes the spectator reflect about his or her capacity to act in an evil way, but when the perpetrator 
exceeds certain unimaginable ethical limits, in this case when Hitler decides that the German people 
must be destroyed because they had proved unable to realize his vision of the Thousand-Year-Reich, 
the spectator feels assured that he or she would never be able to do that.  
Our second example is Joshua Oppenheimer’s documentary The Act of Killing (2012) about 
the 1965–66 killings of more than half a million Indonesian people. Oppenheimer invited one of the 
main perpetrators, a gangster called Anwar Congo, to help him make a movie about the past. The 
latter was happy to accept, because, as he himself states at the beginning of the documentary, ‘the 
younger generations must learn how we created this country’. The documentary is about the making 
of this film, and whereas at first Anwar Congo is proud to show Oppenheimer how he invented new 
methods for executing his victims effectively and cleanly with a wire, at the end of the film he 
returns to the site of the executions, where he is filled with remorse, feels sick and vomits. The 
turning point is in the middle of the documentary, where Congo plays the part of a victim who is 
being tortured and is about to be strangled, and feels the claustrophobic despair of the victim. On a 
later occasion, when Congo is watching this footage together with Oppenheimer, he wonders if his 
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victims felt the same way as he did. Oppenheimer answers that they actually felt worse, because 
they knew that they were going to be killed, and Congo recognizes for the first time that he acted as 
a perpetrator and starts to cry. In our view this way of portraying the perpetrator follows 
Torgovnick’s ‘anyone could be Eichmann’ mode in the sense that the spectator is forced to reflect 
upon the cultural and social conditions that made Anwar Congo act, feel and think the way he did. 
The perpetrator seldom recognizes him/herself as such at the moment of violent action, and it is 
through this kind of multi-perspectivist approach which establishes a real dialogue between the 
victim’s and the perpetrator’s subjective positions that the spectator is compelled to reflect upon the 
social and political circumstances that create the conditions for crime and mass atrocities. 
 
Emotions and passions 
We are of the view that a focus on emotions and passions should not preclude understanding or risk 
undermining democracy. The antagonistic mode privileges emotions in order to cement a strong 
sense of belonging to a particularistic community, focusing on the suffering inflicted by the ‘evil’ 
enemies upon this same community. Empathizing with this suffering leads to passionate feelings 
among all those who identify with the community and who feel ready to fight against those 
identified as ‘evil’. In the cosmopolitan mode, the focus is on the suffering inflicted upon humanity, 
hence upon ‘us all’ as human beings; empathizing with this suffering leads to feelings of 
compassion for and to a dialogue with the ‘Other’. While the antagonistic mode incorporates 
passions but turns them against the ‘Other’, cosmopolitan memory shuns passions in favour of 
compassion. From the perspective of the latter, passions and emotions (with the exception of 
compassion) are seen as an obstacle to dialogue.  
Habermas also argues that emotions and passions prevent dialogue, since the person 
engaged in a dialogue must be fully rational. Habermas gives an example of the type of utterances 
that should not be allowed in rational argumentation: ‘I must confess that I am upset by the poor 
condition my colleague has been in since leaving the hospital’ (1984: 41). Such ‘expressive 
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sentences’ cannot be validated through arguments, as ‘they serve to manifest subjective experiences’ 
(41). We therefore concur with those scholars who have argued that the human being conceived by 
Habermas as engaging in dialogue is both disembodied and unfeeling (Benhabib, 1992; Gardiner, 
2004; Heller, 1982; Roberts, 2012), hence lacking ‘the sensuous experiences of hope and despair, of 
venture and humiliation’ (Heller, 1982: 21, quoted in Gardiner, 2004: 34).  
Rather than replacing passion with compassion, we are of the view, following Mouffe (2005: 
24, 30), that ‘passion’, as ‘one of the various affective forces which are at the origin of collective 
forms of identification’, is necessary in order to reinvigorate the political. Passions and emotions 
can be relied upon to sustain a collective sense of solidarity without demonizing the adversary and 
can also be theorized as sustaining democracy. Following Mouffe, Mihai (2014: 34) contends that 
‘blindness to the affective dimension of politics and its role in maintaining collective identifications 
prevents liberal and deliberative democrats from ascertaining the limited role that reason plays in 
moving people to participate politically’. Emotions, however, should not be viewed as inimical to 
reason and democratic agonism. On the contrary, as Mihai (2014: 46) argued, emotions should be 
seen ‘as presupposing evaluations about the political world and as malleable to transformation 
through agonistic encounters’. As she stated:  
 
Until we understand that emotion presupposes - alongside physiological reactions – thought, 
until we understand that it can be socialized to serve democratic agendas, until we affirm its 
malleability and responsiveness to agonistic persuasion and exhortations, we will not be able 
to account for the productive force that it can play politically’ (2014: 43).  
 
Hence there is a need for ‘preparing emotions for agonism’ and for democratic institutions to 
‘provide arenas for agonistic encounters’ (2014: 40).  
As well as sustaining democracy, emotional involvement can enhance our understanding of 
the role of passions in politics and history and promote dialogue. Recent psychological research has 
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demonstrated that emotions following a traumatic event can even enhance logical argumentation. 
Thus a study carried out after the London terrorist attacks of July 2007 established that people who 
were directly affected by the events and presented strong emotional reactions ‘were better able to 
rely on logic and inhibit the influence of stereotypes related to terrorism than participants who were 
not as closely involved in the events’ (Blanchette and Caparos, 2013: 406; Blanchette, Richards, 
Melnyk and Lavda, 2007). The authors speak of ‘the beneficial impact of trauma on logicality’ 
(2013: 407) and explain this on the basis that greater emotional involvement leads to greater 
motivation in understanding and participating in logical argumentation.  
Benedetta Tobagi, the daughter of an Italian victim of terrorism, in a recent memoir of her 
father, also viewed emotions as facilitating both dialogue and understanding: 
 
If you move only on the emotional aspect you don’t have the instrument to open a space for 
dialogue and rethinking, or sometimes even thinking seriously for the first time - in the 
sense that Hannah Arendt speaks about thinking - and so as far as I am concerned my choice 
was to build up a book that was really tailored to keep together these two aspects in a way 
that emotion is functional to intellectual understanding […] but I was also aware as a would-
be historian that I was so deeply affected by the story that I was telling that it was the most 
honest thing I could do for my reader; to expose also the feelings and the traumas and the 
wounds that the book grew out from.3 [Emphasis added] 
 
Tobagi’s own work (2009, 2013) demonstrated how emotions were for her the key for remembering 
the past in ways which enhanced understanding of the political context and the passions of 1970s 
Italy, including the perspectives of the perpetrators.   
 
Defining agonistic memory  
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So what would characterize an ‘agonistic’ mode of remembering4 and how would it avoid the 
shortcomings identified above? In our view it would present the following features: 1) avoid pitting 
‘good’ against ‘evil’ through acknowledging the human capacity for evil in specific historical 
circumstances and in the context of socio-political struggles; 2) remember the past by relying on the 
testimonies of both perpetrators and victims, as well as witnesses, bystanders, spies and traitors. The 
perspectives of the former perpetrators can provide crucial elements for understanding when, how 
and why people turn into perpetrators; 3) recognize the important role played by emotions and 
promote empathy with the victims as a first step towards remembering the past in ways that 
facilitate and promote critical understanding and also acknowledge civic and political passions; 4) 
reconstruct the historical context, socio-political struggles and individual/collective narratives 
which led to mass crimes being committed. 
The main repertoires of the three modes of remembering are shown in Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1 
The defining characteristics of modes of remembering 
 Antagonistic Mode Cosmopolitan Mode Agonistic Mode 
Nature of Conflict 
 
Good vs. evil 
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Figure 1 obviously outlines ideal prototypes and we fully acknowledge that these traits might 
mingle and interact in real discourse. Our aim is not to find ‘pure’ forms of one or the other mode of 
remembrance, but to understand the background and effect of each of the exposed characteristics. 
On the other hand, it is a working hypothesis that as a default certain types of memory agents are 
inclined towards the use of certain modes of remembering: while populist and/or neo-nationalist 
politicians rely predominantly upon an antagonistic mode, mainstream national/EU politicians and 
memory professionals tend to adopt the cosmopolitan mode. But again, we are speaking about ideal 
prototypes and default expectations here, not of concrete discourse, not least because mainstream 
politicians are often tempted to adopt the antagonistic mode, in an attempt to stem the rising tide of 
populist parties and movements. Creative artists use all three modes, but are as a default expected to 
be the ones most inclined to apply reflexive and self-reflexive modes.  
As previously argued, in contemporary Europe the antagonistic and the reflexive modes of 
belonging are both very much in evidence, but the former is in the ascendancy. The proponents of a 
cosmopolitan mode of remembering rely to a large extent on exposing the artificial and constructed 
nature of memory and identity as the principal means to counteract antagonistic memories. 
However, as we have seen, essentializing representations of the past based on ‘us’ and ‘them’ can 
both be socially constructed in a self-conscious manner and promote intolerance. Exposing the 
artificial nature of memory, therefore, should go hand in hand with promoting a mode of 
remembering, which is both reflexive and dialogic, but does not shy away from addressing 






By depoliticizing the historical context and privileging compassion over socio-political passions, 
cosmopolitan memory leaves the field open for a novel type of memory work that is able to 
manipulate passions and emotions in order to construct a collective sense of ‘sameness’ and target 
real or presumed ‘enemies’. While Rigney (2012a: 620) considers the transnational mediation of 
memory discourses as the way in which creative writing and film-making can promote solidarity 
among people who have not been former enemies, our argument is that the new type of nationalistic 
discourse is itself transnationally mediatized and has proved able to construct unreflexive 
antagonistic memories in a self-conscious manner. Thus exposing the artificial nature of collective 
identities and promoting transnational memory practices – two important traits of cosmopolitan 
memory - constitute necessary but insufficient elements to stem the rise of the antagonistic mode of 
remembering. 
What is needed is a mode of remembering that, as Rigney herself (2012a) stressed, 
acknowledges both the impact of the legacy of bloody historical conflicts upon the European project 
(611), and the importance of ‘dialogic memory to the working through of intra-European conflicts’ 
(620). We are therefore concerned with the specific nature of the memory discourses in circulation 
and advocate promoting a mode of remembering that we have termed ‘agonistic’. In our view, the 
cosmopolitan and the agonistic modes of remembering are not necessarily in contraposition and in 
some cases are even complementary. We recognize the importance of transnational influence on 
local memory discourse, and welcome the creation of collective feelings of solidarity. However, an 
agonistic mode of remembering, in addition to exposing the socially constructed nature of collective 
memory and including the suffering of the ‘Others’, would rely on a multiplicity of perspectives in 
order to bring to light the socio-political struggles of the past and reconstruct the historical context 
in ways which restore the importance of civic and political passions and address issues of individual 






1.  On the antagonistic mode of remembering see especially Erll (2009, 2011). See also 
Leerssen (2001). Related to this mode is the concept of ‘chosen trauma’: see Volkan (2001). On the 
cosmopolitan mode see especially Alexander (2002, 2009); Levy and Sznaider (2002, 2007); Levy, 
Heinlein and Breuer (2011); Nowicka and Rovisco (2009). 
2.  Levy and Sznaider explicitly linked the cosmopolitan mode of remembering to the process 
of globalization and to Beck’s concept of ‘Second Modernity’. 
3. Benedetta Tobagi’s father, Walter, was killed by a terrorist group on 28 May 1980. In 2009 
she published an acclaimed memoir of her father and in 2013 she wrote a book remembering the 
victims of a 1974 bombing attack. The quotation is from an interview she granted to Anna Cento 
Bull as part of the latter’s work on the legacy and memory of Italian terrorism (Cento Bull and 
Cooke 2013). 
4. The need for a type of memory that is able to sustain an ‘agonistic democracy’ was put 
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